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SECTION 18 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:
PUTTING THE BITE BACK INTO THE TOOTHLESS TIGER
INTRODUCTION
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has tolled a new era in
the field of federal securities law by abruptly halting the expansion of the
implied private action arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19341 and its complementary provision, rule 10b-5.2 It is now clear
that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are no longer to be considered the cure for all
evils in the securities market.3 As a result, other sections of the 1934 Act
should take on added importance. Unfortunately, some of these sections have
lost much of their vitality because of a lack of use during the period of section
10(b)'s vast expansion, and thus are in need of substantial reexamination and,
perhaps, revision in light of the purpose of the Act-the protection of the
public investor.
4
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act- is a classic example of a provision that has
been virtually unused since its enactment. Section 18(a) expressly provides
that any person who makes false or misleading statements in a document filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will be liable to anyone
who, in reliance on those statements, purchases or sells a security whose price
was affected by the statements. 6 While section 18(a) is an express liability
provision dealing with specific abuses, section 10(b) is a general proscription
against the use of any manipulative device or contrivance in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.7 Although section 10(b) is directed at
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
3. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rule lob-5 not applicable to breach
of corporate fiduciary duty involving neither manipulation nor deception); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (§ 10(b) not applicable to misrepresentation by competing tender
offeror); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5 not applicable to
negligent misstatements or omissions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5 not applicable to plaintiffs who are neither purchasers nor sellers of
securities).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
5. Id. § 78r(a) (1976).
6. Section 18(a) provides: "Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in
any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder .... which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which
it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person..
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was
affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A
person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the
payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees,
against either party litigant." Id.
7. Section 10(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
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different abuses,' courts have nevertheless frequently implied a cause of
action under the section in favor of plaintiffs alleging that documents filed
with the SEC contained false or misleading statements, 9 liability for which is
expressly provided for by section 18(a). By expanding section 10(b) in this
way, the courts have negated the need for section 18(a) and have, in effect,
rendered it superfluous.
This judicial desire to use section 10(b) rather than section 18(a) is perhaps
explained by the fact that the little case law which does exist under section
18(a) has generally interpreted the statute in a manner that makes it difficult
for plaintiffs to recover. 10 Courts have held that a plaintiff asserting a cause
of action under section 18(a) must prove actual rather than constructive
reliance." In addition, the statute is, by its own terms, applicable only to
documents filed with the SEC, 1 2 and thus only "the diligent few who peruse
filed corporate reports"'13 can assert a claim under this section. Most investors
never even see, much less read, these documents. 14 When these two pre-
requisites are viewed together, recovery under section 18(a) becomes virtually
impossible. Because the documents are unread, there can be no actual
reliance.
This Note will argue that any deficiencies in the ability of section 18(a) to
protect the public investor can be cured by a more realistic interpretation of
the section itself and not by the use of seclion 10(b), which was designed to
cover different abuses. Part I will examine the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting section 10(b) and the legislative history of the 1934 Act, and
will conclude that section 18(a) should be the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs
alleging a purchase or sale of securities made in reliance on false or misleading
statements made in documents filed with the SEC. Part II will suggest how
section 18(a) can be revitalized, a necessary step if it is to play an effective role
in regulating securities frauds and protecting unwary investors.
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the (Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
8. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
9. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Gross v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Seiden v. Nicholson, 69
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. 111. 1976); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. fll. 1967); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See generally SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1951).
10. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
See also A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 § 3.02[h] (rev. ed. 1978); 3 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 1751-54 (2d ed. 1961).
11. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Barotz
v. Monarch Gen., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,933, at
97,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
12. See note 6 supra.
13. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975).
14. See Cohen, 'Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1359-60 (1966).
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I. THE CASE FOR EXCLUSIVITY
A. The Rise and Fall of Section 10(b)
The growth of rule 10b-5 litigation has bordered on the spectacular.
Although section 10(b) did not by its terms create an express private remedy
for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress,' 5 or the SEC when
adopting rule 10b-5,1 6 contemplated such a remedy, a private cause of action
for violations of the statute and the rule was soon implied in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 17 and its existence is now well established.18 The
private action under the rule has been referred to as "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn."' 9 Over the years, rule 10b-5
developed into a potent remedy used to proscribe a wide variety of frauds in
connection with securities transactions. 20 The rule was used to outlaw misrep-
resentations and omissions of material facts in various written and oral
statements, 2 1 corporate mismanagement, 22 insider use of nonpublic material
information, 23 and objectionable activities of broker-dealers and other
15. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 17, at 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Legislative History]. This report makes no mention of an express civil remedy.
16. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). This release is similarly
void of any reference to the creation of an express civil remedy.
17. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975), Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
19. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
20. Rule 10b-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.FR.
§ 240.10b-5 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971) (deceptively gloomy press release concerning mineral exploration by corporation
causing investors to sell their stock in that corporation); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir
1970) (misleading prospectus and map in connection with oil lease and failure to convey correct
information as to depth of oil well hole); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189
(N.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971) (failure of defendants to notify
purchasers of securities that shares' ever-increasing prices were due to defendants' market manipu-
lation).
22. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of control of corporation in
the form of sale of stock at a premium over market value); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F 2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (majority stockholder using control over corpora-
tion to acquire 500,000 shares at vastly inadequate price shortly before public announcement of
corporation's oil discovery); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (corporate directors' -gale
of corporation's stock to themselves).
23. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir
1974), affig 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (underwriter divulging material inside information
19781
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fiduciaries. 24 Although a plaintiff may not always win his case on the
merits, 2S the breadth of the rule's scope has given even unresolved rule lob-5
lawsuits a potential settlement value.
26
In contrast, lawsuits brought under section 18(a) have been virtually
nonexistent. 27 Although this is attributable in part to the difficulties of
proving a section 18(a) suit, 28 the primary reason for this development is that
under the expansive judicial interpretations of rule lOb-5, section 18(a)
protection became unnecessary. 29 For example, in Miller v. Bargain City,
U.S.A., Inc.,30 the plaintiffs had purchased Bargain City stock relying on
information contained in detailed financial reports and statements filed with
the SEC which the plaintiffs subsequently claimed was inaccurate and
misleading. The defendant argued that a section 10(b) action could not be
brought by the plaintiffs because they had alleged misconduct specifically
covered by section 18 of the Act. In response, the court stated:
[I]t is true that the specific conduct alleged in the complaint would appear to amount to
the type of- fraud which is covered by section [8. However, it is also true that the
complaint alleges that defendants employed a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
and that they engaged in an "act, practice or course of business" which operated as a
fraud or deceit. These allegations are certainly broad enough to permit evidence of
conduct violative of Rule 1Ob-5.
3 1
Similarly, in Heit v. Weitzen, 32 the plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased
the defendant corporation's convertible debentures in reliance on various
statements made in filed documents that misrepresented the corporation's net
assets and past and prospective income. The court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action under rule lOb-5. 33 More importantly, it noted that if
the plaintiffs could establish actual reliance on the corporation's annual 10-K
report, 34 a document filed with the SEC, they would have a concurrent
to its customers); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (corporation's tipping of
material inside information creating market unfairness even though no direct action was taken on
information conveyed); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(corporate officers' purchases of stock and recommendations to others for such purchases while In
possession of material undisclosed information relating to corporation's discovery of ore).
24. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (dealer's violations of 1934 Act
aided and abetted by corporation's failure to report to SEC his fraudulent use of customers' funds);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (misrepresentation and nondisclo-
sure of facts material to plaintiffs' purchase and sale of stock by partner in stock brokerage firm);
Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D N.Y. 1965) (misrepresentations by broker
that recommended means of financing for plaintiff's purchase of stock was usual and proper).
25. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1792.
26. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975).
27. See A. Jacobs, supra note 10, § 3.02[h], at 1-105 to -106.
28. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
29. See A. Jacobs, supra note 10, § 3.02[h], at 1-106 & n.26.
30. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
31. Id. at 36-37; accord, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 11. 1967).
32. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
33. Id. at 914.
34. The 10-K report is an annual report filed wirh the SEC providing year-end financial
information. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
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section 18 claim for relief as well.35
The expansive era of section 10(b) came to a halt, however, with a series of
recent Supreme Court decisions that have substantially reduced the scope of
rule 10b-5. 36 Although not directly concerned with section 18(a), the underlying
rationale of these decisions would seem to reject the reasoning of Miller and
Heit, and bar a rule 10b-5 action when the claim would be assertable under
section 18(a).
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,37 suit was brought under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by a nonpurchasing offeree of Blue Chip Stamp
Company securities. The plaintiff alleged that the prospectus containing the
offer, an extremely pessimistic document in its appraisal of the offeror's status
and future prospects, was materially misleading and designed to discourage
the plaintiff and other offerees from buying the shares at a bargain price,
thereby enabling the offeror to sell the securities to the general public at a
higher price.3 8 In holding the plaintiff to be barred from maintaining the suit,
a majority of the Court emphatically reinforced the validity of Birubaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.,39 a Second Circuit case which had established that only
a person who had been defrauded in connection with his own purchase or sale
of securities had standing to bring a private cause of action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. 40 The Court in Blue Chip noted that Congress had
rejected a proposed amendment to section 10(b) to change its wording from
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" to "in connection
with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any
security. '41 This rejection was regarded as evidence of a congressional intent
to limit the benefits of section 10(b)'s implied private right of action to actual
purchasers and sellers.4 2 The Court also reasoned that because the express
remedy sections of the 1934 Act and the Securities Act of 1933 were expressly
limited to purchasers and sellers of securities 43 and had been enacted contem-
35. 402 F.2d at 916. For other cases that have permitted plaintiffs to bring suit under both §
18(a) and rule lob-5 for the same alleged violations, either by refusing to accept the exclusivity
argument or by simply ignoring the problem, see note 9 supra.
36. The Court's restriction of § 10(b) is part of an overall trend to narrow the scope of the
federal securities laws. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway. Inc.. 426 US. 438 11976)
(narrowing the definition of "material" misrepresentations giving rise to actionable wrongs under
the 1934 Act); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (liability of
stockholders under § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), limited to those having 10%
beneficial interest before and after short-swing transaction); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp, 422
U.S. 49 (1975) (class of private litigants who may obtain injunctive relief under § 13(d) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), limited to those who can show "irreparable harm"); Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no implied cause of action held to exist
under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa.78111 (1976), in favor of
customers to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to act).
37. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
38. Blue Chip had been required, pursuant to a consent decree, to offer new shares to retailers
who had used its stamp service in the past before the shares could be offered to the general public.
Id. at 725-26.
39. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
40. 421 U.S. at 754-55.
41. Id. at 732 (citing S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 Cong. Rec. 11636 (1957)).
42. Id. at 733.
43. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil liability for false registration
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
poraneously with section 10(b), Congress could not have intended to create a
broader plaintiff class in an implied cause of action than it had created under
those express liability provisions. 4 4 Finally, the Court expressed concern over
the possible increase in "strike suits" that could result from a widely expanded
class of plaintiffs under rule lob-5.
45
Less than one year after Blue Chip, the Supreme Court decided Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.46 An investor who used the services of a brokerage firm
sought damages from Ernst & Ernst, the brokerage firm's public accountant,
in a civil action for negligence brought under section 10(b) and rule lob-5.
The plaintiff alleged that Ernst & Ernst had failed to discover a fraudulent
securities scheme perpetrated by the president of the brokerage firm. The
Supreme Court held that section 10(b) was limited to willful and knowing acts
and did not include negligent misstatements or omissions.4 7 The Court based
its decision on three considerations. First, it reasoned that because section
10(b) used the words "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances,"
Congress clearly intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct
"designed to deceive or defraud investors. '48 Second, the Court concluded
that the legislative history of section 10(b) revealed no indication of a
congressional intent to proscribe conduct that did not involve scienter. 4 9 The
third basis for the Court's conclusion was its belief that the interrelated
scheme of the federal securities laws would be seriously disrupted if section
10(b) were interpreted to reach negligence. Because those provisions imposing
liability for negligence were accompanied by certain procedural limitations
which had no counterpart in section 10(b), the use of a negligence standard in
section 10(b) actions would, in effect, nullify the procedural restrictions
present in the other provisions." The Court also noted that section 10(b)
lacked any safeguards to deter actions that were brought solely for their
statements); § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1976) (civil liability arising in connection with prospectuses and
communications). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976) (civil liability for
manipulation of security prices); § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976) (civil liability for false or misleading
statements in documents filed with the SEC).
44. 421 U.S. at 736.
45. Id. at 740-43, 749.
46. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
47. Id. at 214. In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, which had held
that one who breached a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed to another was liable in damages for
aiding and abetting a third party's violation of rule 10b-5, if the fraud would have been discovered
or prevented but for the breach. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
48. 425 U.S. at 199.
49. Id. at 202. The Court noted that § 10(b) had been described as a "catchall" clause designed
"to enable the Commission 'to deal with new manipulative (or cunning] devices,' "and that It was
difficult to believe that a legislative draftsman would have used these words if the intent had been
to create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions. Id. at 203 (quoting Stock Exchange
Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), reprinted in 8 Legislative History, supra note
15, Item 23, at 115 (1973)).
50. "Such extension [of § 10(b) to proscribe negligent conduct] would allow causes of action
covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 [the provisions prescribing liability for negligence] to be brought
instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions on these express actions." 425 U.S. at 210. See generally id. at 206-11.
[Vol. 47
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potential settlement value, safeguards that were present in the express liability
provisions.51
This restrictive interpretative approach has continued in more recent cases.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,5 2 the Supreme Court refused to imply
a private damage remedy under section 10(b) in favor of a tender offeror
claiming misrepresentation by a successful competitor. s3 The Court was guided
by the principle that a private cause of action under the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act should not be implied when "unnecessary to ensure
the fulfillment of Congress' purposes"5 4 in adopting the Act-the protection of
the public investor.55 Similarly, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,s 6 the
Court refused to imply a cause of action under rule 10b-5 for a breach of
corporate fiduciary duty not involving manipulation or deception. 5 The
Court's reasoning was similar to that inHochfelder and Blue Chip, namely that
since both the language of section 10(b) and its legislative history indicate a
concern with contrivances that defraud, it should not be extended into the
complicated and completely different area of what constitutes proper corporate
behavior.5 8
As important as the particular holdings of these cases are, the common
analytical framework throughout these decisions is even more significant. The
51. Id. at 210 & n.30. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that Ernst & Ernst had
violated rule 10b-5. Although conceding that the language of rule lob-S, viewed in isolation, could
be read as proscribing any course of misconduct, "intentional or not," the Court reasoned that
because rule 10b-5 was promulgated in furtherance of § 10(b), it would be inappropriate for the
rule's scope to exceed the power Congress had granted the Commission under § 10(b). Id. at 212-14.
52. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
53. Id. at 24-42. Both Chris-Craft Industries and Bangor Punta Corporation wished to acquire
Piper, a corporation principally owned and managed by the Piper family. The family decided to
block Chris-Craft's takeover bid by negotiating with Bangor Punta for a merger. The family
informed all shareholders that the price offered by Chris-Craft was inadequate, even though
outside financial advisors had determined that the price was reasonable. Bangor agreed to pay the
Pipers a premium for their shares, a fact which was not disclosed. Bangor also failed to reveal that
one of its assets was overvalued by some $13 million. Bangor then filed a registration statement
and, while awaiting SEC approval, it purchased shares of Piper stock, obtaining control over the
company. Chris-Craft then sued for an injunction against the merger, an order restraining Bangor
from voting its shares, and for damages under § 10(b). Id. at 4-10.
54. Id. at 41.
55. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff here was actually seeking damages for having been
wrongfully denied a "fair opportunity" to compete for control of another corporation, a situation
that Congress should perhaps remedy, but one obviously not meant to be covered by existing
federal securities legislation. Id. at 40-41.
56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
57. Id. at 474-77. In 1936, petitioner Santa Fe Industries had acquired control of 60o of the
stock of Kirby Lumber Corporation, a Delaware corporation. Through a series of purchases over
the following years, Santa Fe increased its control of Kirby's stock to 95%. In 1974, wishing to
acquire 100% ownership of Kirby, Santa Fe availed itself of § 253 of the Delaware Corporation
Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977), the state's "short-form merger"
statute which authorized the merger of a 90% owned subsidiary into the parent corporation by the
unilateral vote of the parent's board of directors. The provisions of this statute were fully complied
with, but the minority stockholders of Kirby objected to the terms of the merger and brought this
action. Id. at 465-67.
58. Id. at 477-78.
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guiding principles that can be gleaned include: (1) an adherence to con-
gressional intent, as evidenced by the statutory language and legislative history
of section 10(b), and a desire to use section 1C(b) only for the purposes for which
it was drafted;5 9 (2) a desire to construe section 10(b) consistently with other
sections of the 1934 Act;60 and (3) concern that the continued expansion of
section 10(b) would result in an increase in strike suits or nuisance litigation
brought for its settlement value.
6 1
Despite these principles established by the Supreme Court, recent lower
court decisions that have dealt with section 10(b) actions alleging violations
within the scope of section 18(a) have been inconsistent in their pronounce-
ments. In Seiden v. Nicholson,62 the plaintiffs brought suit under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, alleging that the defendants had filed misleading annual and
interim reports which artificially inflated the market price of the defendant
corporation's stock, thereby causing the plaintiffs to purchase these securities
at an excessive price. The defendants argued that rule lob-5 should not be
expanded so as to ignore the procedural requirements set out in the express
liability sections of the securities laws and, therefore, if any cause of action did
exist, it would have to be brought under section 18. The court, however,
endorsed the view that securities legislation should be construed flexibly and
that the remedies provided by the 1934 Act were cumulative. 63 Similarly, in
Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 64 the plaintiffs alleged that they had
purchased the defendant's shares in reliance on its " 'false and misleading
annual and quarterly reports, financial statements and other materials' ",65 filed
with the SEC, claiming that this misconduct violated both section 18 and rule
lob-5. Although the court dismissed the plaintiffs' section 18 claim for failing to
allege reliance on any particular document, it had no difficulty in finding that
the action could still proceed solely on the claimed rule lob-5 violation. 66
The court in Kulchok v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 67 however,
when presented with a plaintiff's claim of section 10(b) and section 18 viola-
tions for defendant's false and misleading statements in filed documents, held
that no cause of action arose by implication under section 10(b) or rule lob-5
based on violations encompassed by section 18:
[S]ince each misstatement or omission alleged ... is a misstatement or omission which
appears in a document filed by [the defendant) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ... and since Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an
express civil private cause of action for damages with respect to documents filed with the
SEC, the facts alleged... do not give rise to an implied cause of action under Section
10(b) . .. or SEC rules thereunder .... 68
59. Id. at 472-74; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 24-36; Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 200-01; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 732-33.
60. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 42-46; Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 206-11; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 734-36.
61. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. at 739.
62. 69 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. ll. 1976).
63. Id. at 684-86.
64. 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
65. 1d. at 1087.
66. Id. at 1093.
67. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 96,002 (D.D.C. 1977).
68. Id. at 91,512.
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Although the Supreme Court cases discussed above were not directly con-
cerned with section 18(a), the interpretative approach utilized by the Court
would seem to undermine the viability of those cases that have rejected the
exclusive application of section 18(a). Those cases do not sufficiently take into
account the legislative histories of section 18(a) and section 10(b), a thorough
examination of which would seem to be mandated by the recent Supreme Court
decisions. 69 Such an examination clearly supports the exclusivity argument:
when the facts alleged in a complaint fall within the purview of section 18(a),
there should be no implied cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
B. The Proper Relationship Between Section 18(a) And Section 10(b)
In the debates concerning the passage of the 1934 Act, Congress clearly
recognized the need for express civil remedies for violations of certain provisions
of the Act-
[I]f an investor has suffered loss by reason of illicit practices, it is equitable that he should
be allowed to recover damages from the guilty party. ... [T]he bill provides that any
person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who induces transactions
in a security by means of false or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation, shall be liable in damages to those
who have bought or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In
such case the burden is on the plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied thereon to his damage. The
defendant may escape liability by showving that the statement was made in good faith.70
The implementation of these purposes was left to three separate provisions.
Section 9 proscribes the use of certain manipulative devices which affect the
price of a security and the use of false or misleading statements to induce
transactions in a security. 7 1 Section 16(b) is designed to disgorge short-swing
profits made by a director, officer, or 10% beneficial equity security holder,7 2
and section 18 is the express remedy provision for false or misleading state-
ments in reports filed with the SEC which induce the purchase or sale of a
security. 73
Section 18 contains carefully prescribed substantive and procedural require-
ments, indicating a congressional desire to tailor the remedy to the particular
abuse it was designed to prevent. Under section 18, the class of plaintiffs is
limited to those persons who, because of actual reliance on the false or mislead-
ing statements, purchased or sold a security whose price was affected by the
statements. 74 The section expressly provides the issuer of the statement with a
defense if he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that the statement was
false or misleading. 75 Actions under section 18 are also limited by a relatively
short statute of limitations, 76 .and the district court in which the action is
69. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
70. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934), reprinted in S Legislative History, supra
note 15, Item 17, at 12-13 (1973).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
72. Id. § 78p(b) (1976). Short-swing profits are those profits realized by an officer, director, or
beneficial owner of more than 10% of a corporation's equity securities in connection width the
purchase and sale, within six months of one another, of equity securities in that corporation. Id.
73. Id. § 78r(a) (1976), quoted at note 6 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 78r(c) (1976). This section provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any
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brought is authorized to require the plaintiff to post a bond for costs, including
attorney's fees, and to assess those costs at the conclusion of the litigation. 77
These carefully prescribed requirements of section 18 are not present in
section 10(b) and rule lob-5, though there are some similarities between the two
causes of action. In actions brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
plaintiff must also be a purchaser or seller of a security, 78 and he must prove
scienter on the part of the defendant in order to succeed. 79 Aside from a shift in
the burden of proof, this scienter requirement is similar to the good faith
defense provided defendants in section 18 actions.8 0 These similarities, how-
ever, can not hide the fact that section 10(b) and rule lob-5 do not have section
18's procedural restrictions relating to a statute of limitations, attorney's fees,
and costs. 8 1 By implying a cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 for
misconduct specifically covered by section 18, the courts have permitted plain-
tiffs to avoid section 18's limitations. Although a laissez-faire attitude toward
securities fraud would not serve the purposes of the 1934 Act, there is still no
general legal principle that courts, in fashioning substantive law, should do so
in a manner that makes it easier for a plaintiff to obtain a judgment.8 2 Congress
drafted section 18 and the civil liability sections with great care. By allowing
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to cover violations that fall within the purview of
section 18, the courts have, in effect, deemed it to be the intent of Congress to
nullify the substantive and procedural restrictions of one section by implication
in another. This interpretation is surely questionable. As the Supreme Court
stated in Hochfelder in a similar context, "[w]e would be unwilling to bring
about this result absent substantial support in the legislative history, and there
is none. '8 3
The legislative history and purpose of section 10(b) also support the argu-
ment for the exclusivity of section 18(a). Section 10(b) was designed to close any
loopholes which might develop in the SEC's ability to regulate speculative
practices. In testimony during congressional hearings concerning the 1934 Act,
one of the drafters of the Act explained that section 10(b) (then section 9(c)) was
a catch-all clause designed to prevent the use of those manipulative devices not
liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued."
77. Id. § 78r(a) (1976), quoted at note 6 supra.
78. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
79. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
80. 3 L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1752.
81. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1977) with 15 U.S.C. §§
78r(a), (c) (1976). Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 contain no provisions relating to a statute of
limitations or to the apportionment of attorneys' fees and costs.
82. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742 (1975). The standard of
proof for implied causes of action under § 10(b) and rule l0b-5 is also less burdensome to plaintiffs.
Whereas constructive reliance is sufficient under § 10(b) and rule lob-5, actual reliance must be
proved by a § 18(a) plaintiff. See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
83. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 (1976) (footnote omitted). In Hoclhfelder,
the Supreme Court faced the analogous problem of whether to expand § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to
cover negligent misconduct, thereby allowing plaintiffs to bypass the procedural and substantive
restrictions present in the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 which expressly proscribe such
misconduct.
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already covered by express provisions. 84 The report of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency similarly explained that section 10(b) "authorizes the
Commission by rules and regulations to prohibit or regulate the use of any other
manipulative or deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interests of
the investor."8 5 Thus, it is evident that section 10(b) was originally intended to
be limited to use in connection with manipulative devices which were new and
unknown in 1934,86 activities far different from those towards which section 18
was directed. 8
7
The cases allowing section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to overlap into the areas
covered by section 18(a) also show no appreciation for the fact that section 10(b)
is only one part, albeit an important one, in the entire scheme of federal
securities regulation. The development of a sensible interrelationship between
section 10(b) and section 18(a) is a necessary step for the smooth functioning of
84. Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of
Thomas G. Corcoran), reprinted in 8 Legislative History, supra note 15, Item 23, at 115 (1973),
85. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra
note 15, Item 17, at 18 (1973).
86. This was the situation in the seminal decision of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), in which the court first implied a private cause of action under § 10(b)
and rule lob-5 because the defendant's activities did not fall within any of the express liability
provisions of the federal securities laws. Id. at 514.
The administrative history of rule 10b-5 also gives no indication of the extremely expansive area
which it has come to cover. In contrast to the carefully constructed express liability provisions of
the 1934 Act, the rule had a surprisingly casual origin. As described by one of its drafters: "I looked
at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17 [of the 1933 Act], and I put them together. ... We
called the Commission and we got on the calendar.. . . We passed a piece of paper around to all
the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating
approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said 'Well . . we are against fraud,
aren't we?' That is how it happened." Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (statement of Milton Freeman). As Professor Loss argues, the courts
should not continue to "go on building a tremendous jurisprudential superstructure on a little rule,
lob-5, that was adopted one afternoon in five minutes, at a time when the Commission was never
thinking of civil liabilities." Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. Law. 527, 535 (1969).
87. Of course, any analysis of legislative history can become a two-edged sword. For example,
§ 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976), which makes it unlawful-for any person
to use a device, scheme, or untrue statement which operates as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser
of a security, has similarly been held to provide an implied private right of action, see, e.g.,
Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975), though this infringes upon three express private
remedies of the 1933 Act which appear to cover the great majority of abuses at which the Act's
proscriptions were directed. See § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil liability for false registration
statements); § 12(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1), (2) (1976) (civil liability for false or misleading
prospectuses and communications). This could be strong support for allowing the similar develop-
ment of § 10(b) and rule lob-5 in the 1934 Act. Any force to this argument is dissipated, however,
when one realizes that the courts that have held a private right of action to exist under § 17
apparently proceeded on the supposition that "[o]nce it has been established. . . that an aggrieved
buyer has a private action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical point in
denying the existence of such an action under § 17 .... " SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also
Note, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Recently Restricted Rule
10b-5, 9 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 340, 348-50 (1977). Section 17's implied private remedy developed after
and because of the expansion of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, not vice versa.
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the disclosure mechanisms instituted by the 1934 Act. This development is
subverted, however, when plaintiffs are allowed to bring implied actions under
section 10(b) and thereby avoid the substantive and procedural restrictions of
section 18. Such a result disregards Congress' recognition of the significance of
section 18's restrictions in protecting against strike suits,8 8 and is in opposition
to the Supreme Court's desire to establish the proper interaction between the
provisions of the 1934 Act.8 9
Cases involving the interaction of section 18 with other sections of the 1934
Act besides section 10(b) have exhibited a new-found receptivity to the exclusiv-
ity argument. For example, in Lewis v. Elam,90 the court refused to imply a
cause of action under section 13(a) of the 1934 Act 9 for misconduct governed
by the express sanctions found in section 18(a). 92 In so holding, the court joined
88. The Senate Report specifically notes that the provision respecting assessment of costs was
designed as a "[p]rotection against strike suits." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934),
reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra note 15, Item 17, at 21 (1973).
89. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. A clear separation between the functions of §
10(b), rule lOb-5, and § 18(a) would also seem to be mandated by the maxim of statutory
construction expressio unius est exctusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another). The maxim was relied on in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the
termination of rail service, basing his claim on an implied cause of action under the Rail Passengers
Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976). The Act specifically empowered the Attorney Gen-
eral to enforce its provisions and contained no express authorization for suits by passengers In these
circumstances. The Supreme Court refused to imply such a cause of action, declaring that because
the Act created a public cause of action for its enforcement and a private cause of action only under
very limited circumstances, the maxim compelled the conclusion that the remedies created ex-
pressly by the Act were the exclusive means by which to enforce its duties and obligations. 414 U S.
at 458. The analogy to the securities field is clear. The 1934 Act empowers the SEC to enforce its
provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976), and private causes of action are carefully and narrowly
circumscribed. See notes 71-81 supra and accompanying text. Thus, § 18(a), and not § 10(b), should
be invoked in actions by purchasers and sellers of securities injured by reliance on information filed
with the SEC. Although the maxim "must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent," 414
U.S. at 458, no such contrary evidence of legislative intent is indicated by the history behind either
§ 10(b) or § 18(a). See notes 74-86 supra and accompanying text.
Some commentators have criticized the use of the expressio unius maxim in National Railroad.
See, e.g., McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and
Retrenchment, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 167, 184 (1976); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under
Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1392, 1417 (1975); Note,
The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative
Oversight orLegislation by theJudiciary?, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 441, 445, 457 (1974). This did not,
however, prevent Judge Mulligan from utilizing the maxim in Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 96,404 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1978), to argue that no Implied
private right of action should exist under § 17 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976), for an
alleged violation that comes within the coverage of § 18. (Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,440 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
90. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976). Section 13(a) requires every issuer of a security registered
pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), to file with the SEC all information, documents,
and reports as required by its rules and regulations for the proper protection of Investors and to
ensure fair dealing in the security.
92. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,554.
SECTION 18
an increasing number of courts that have recognized the exclusivity of the
express remedy found in section 18(a) in refusing to imply causes of action
under section 13(a).93
For section 18(a) to achieve full-fledged viability, it should not be bypassed
simply because a plaintiff may find it more difficult to sustain his burden of
proof under this section than under section 10(b). 94 Rather, any perceived
deficiencies in the ability of section 18(a) to protect fully the public investor
should be cured by a more logical interpretation of the section itself.
11. REVITALIZING SECTION 18
A. The Current Status of Section 18
The target of any reinterpretation of section 18(a) must be its two distinct, yt.
interrelated, requirements: (1) the false or misleading statement must be in a
document filed with the SEC, 95 and (2) the plaintiff must have actually relied
on the statement. 96
A wide variety of documents are filed with the SEC under the 1934 Act, the
most important being the reports required under sections 13(a) and 15(d).
Section 13(a) requires every issuer of a security registered pursuant to the Act to
file such current reports as may be required by the SEC. 97 Section 15(d) of the
Act requires issuers filing registration statements under the 1933 Act to file
reports similar to those filed under section 13(a) in each year after the registra-
tion statement becomes effective, unless the class of securities sold is then held
of record by fewer than 300 people. 98 The section 13(a) and 15(d) reports for
most companies presently consist of an annual Form 10-K report providing
year-end financial information, a Form 10-Q submitted after the end of each of
the first three fiscal quarters supplying quarterly financial data, and a Form
8-K, the reporting form for significant current corporate events and transac-
tions. 99
93. See, e.g., Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. tCCH) 95,899
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976); duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973). But cf.
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,404 (2d Cir. Apr 21,
1978) (implied private right of action held to exist under § 17 of the 1934 Act for alleged violation
within the coverage of § 18(a)). In Redington, the plaintiffs were brokers' customers injured as a
result of an accountant's misleading statements. There had been, however, no purchase or sale of
an affected security, id. at 93,435, and therefore implying a right of action in this case prevented
the plaintiffs from being left without any remedy whatsoever.
94. See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), quoted at note 6 supra.
96. Although actual reliance is not specified in the statute as a prerequisite for a plaintiff's
claim, courts have interpreted § 18(a) to require actual reliance. See note 103 infra and accompany-
ing text.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976). This section applies to issuers who are required to register a class
of their securities under § 12 of the Act, id. § 781(1976). Issuers are required to register under § 12 if
a class of their securities is either listed on a national securities exchange or comprised of equity
securities held of record by at least 500 persons and the issuer's total assets exceed $1 million. Id. §
781(b), (g) (1976).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976), as amended by Act of Dec. 19, 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, § 204, 91
Sat. 1500.
99. A. Jacobs, supra note 10, § 3.02[h], at 1-103. Form 10-K is required by 17 C.F.R. §§
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Unfortunately, the great majority of these disclosures merely amount to
public filings with the SEC without any physical delivery to individual inves-
tors.' 00 Thus, any usefulness they might have is dependent on the extent to
which public investors and members of the financial community actively seek
out and use the filed information. 1 1
Problems have also surrounded the actual reliance requirement of section 18.
Whereas constructive reliance is the appropriate standard for implied causes of
action brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,102 "[rieliance on the actual
• ..report is an essential prerequisite for a Section 18 action and constructive
reliance is not sufficient."' 0 3 Therefore, a section 18(a) plaintiff is left with the
virtually impossible task of proving actual reliance on filed documents that
generally go unread. It therefore becomes evident that what is needed is a filed
document that satisfies the investor's right to know and, at the same time, is
more readily accessible to the public.
B. A Proposed Solution
Some commentators have attempted to resolve this predicament by arguing
for a more flexible reliance requirement in section 18(a) actions. 104 An alterna-
tive solution to easing the plaintiff's burden under section 18(a) would be to
classify the annual report received by the stockholders' 0 5 as a "filed" document.
This annual report is probably the most widely disseminated and used corpo-
rate disclosure document. 10 6 There are two basic reasons for its widespread
use. First, annual reports include important substantive material: 107 (a) cer-
tified financial statements for the company's last two fiscal years;108 (b) a
summary of the company's recent operations and management's analysis of that
material; 0 9 (c) a brief description of the company's business;I 10 (d) a "lines of
business" breakdown for the company's operations;"' (e) identification of the
240.13a-1,. 15d-I (1977). Form 10-Q is required by 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13,. 15d-13 (1977). Form
8-K is required by 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, .i5d-il (1977).
100. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1359 (1966).
101. Id. at 1360.
102. The Supreme Court resolved any doubt concerning the applicability of a constructive
reliance standard in rule lob-5 cases in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
152-54 (1972). Accord, Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
103. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969). See also Barotz v. Monarch Gen., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,933, at 97,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. See, e.g., A. Jacobs, supra note 10, § 3.02[h], at 1-104 n.22; 3 L. Loss, supra note 10, at
1753 n.227.
105. The annual report is required to precede or accompany the proxy statement sent by
management to the shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1977).
106. Sommer, TheAnnualReport:A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 Duke L.J. 1093, 1098.
107. The disclosure of this material is not completely due to the corporation's concern with
informing its shareholders. Rather, it is also required by the SEC. See notes 108-13 ittfra and
accompanying text.
108. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(b)(1), (3) (1977).
109. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(4).
110. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(5).
111. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(6). "Lines of business" refers to the various different business enter-
prises in which the corporation is engaged.
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company's directors and executive officers; 112 and (f) identification of the prin-
cipal market in which the company's voting securities are traded and a state-
ment of the ranges of market price and dividends paid on such securities for
each quarterly period during the company's two most recent fiscal years.113
Second, the annual report to the shareholders relays this information in a more
discursive and interesting manner than the 10-K report1 4 which, though
containing most of the above material,IIs is less readable because of its formal
nature.1 1 6 These attributes, combined with the fact that the stockholders'
annual report is one of the few disclosure materials physically delivered to the
public investor, enable it to be actually read, and thus relied on, by a greater
number of people. By refusing to give "filed" status to the annual report,"17
the SEC is preserving form at the expense of substance.
This proposal to include the annual report in the category of "filed" docu-
ments is not a new one. The SEC proposed an amendment in 1942 that would
have expanded the definition of "proxy soliciting material" required to be filed
with the SEC at least ten days before it is mailed to shareholders to include the
annual report, 18 thus subjecting the annual report to the potential liabilities of
section 18(a). 19 This proposal, however, resulted in a protest from issuers who
complained that the effect of such liability would be to inhibit communication
between management and shareholders concerning corporate affairs. 120 In
response to these protests, the SEC finally decided not to enact the proposal, 12 1
and the reports continued to be deemed not "filed" for purposes of section 18. 22
Although the SEC subsequently established indirect methods for regulating
annual reports, 123 it has always retreated from classifying them as "filed"
documents. 124 The courts, however, were unwilling to view this refusal to give
112. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(7).
113. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(8).
114. Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821,
and H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 7th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1943) (statement of then-SEC chairman Ganson Purcell) [hereinafter cited as 1943
Hearings].
115. See D. Beresford, R. Busch & R. Neary, SEC Form 10-K- A Guide to Financial Reporting
§ 2.04 (1977).
116. 1943 Hearings, supra note 114, at 20 (statement of then-SEC chairman Ganson Purcelj.
117. The SEC has the power to require such a "filing." See 15 U.S.C. § 78ula) (1976).
118. Sommer, supra note 106, at 1101-02.
119. Id. at 1102.
120. Hearings on Stock Market Study Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1556 (1955), quoted in Sommer, supra note 106, at 1102.
121. Sommer, supra note 106, at 1102.
122. This was explicitly confirmed in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3380 (Feb. 5,
1943).
123. In 1954, the SEC amended Form 10-K to require that if a registrant distributed an annual
report to shareholders, a copy of the report must be furnished to the SEC not later than the date it
was mailed to shareholders. If no such report was furnished to shareholders, the SEC should be so
told in the form. SEC Release U-159 (Jan. 28, 1954). The report, however, is still not considered
filed for § 18(a) purposes, and no liability is incurred under that section for false or misleading
statements in the report. Instead, the SEC seems to indulge in the presumption that the prospect of
examination of these furnished reports by interested public investors %vill be sufficient to maintain
their accuracy. See id.
124. The closest the SEC ever came to so doing was subjecting the annual report to § 18
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"filed" status to the stockholders' annual report as evidence that there should be
no liability at all for false or misleading statements in these documents, and
thus they applied section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to fill the gap. 12S Although this
use of section 10(b) and rule lob-5 was understandable in that the courts were
faced with a perceived wrong which had been left uncovered by any express
remedy, the fact remains that this contributed to the expansion of both the
section and the rule into areas not originally intended.
This improper use of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 can be corrected by directly
subjecting the annual report to the potential liabilities of section 18(a). Doing so
would accomplish two goals: it would revitalize section 18(a) by making it
applicable to an area which is well within is natural scope, and section 10(b)
and rule lob-5 would be replaced by a standard which provides the limitations
on liability that Congress has deemed essential for similar securities reports and
financial material. 126 This proposal is supported by Professor Loss who, as
head of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, said:
Another basic idea that might be developed is to give the Commission direct jurisdiction
over the annuai report to stockholders. That, after all, is the document that gets to
people.... Why should we have a system in which the Commission regulates what goes
into an occasional prospectus but cannot say what goes into the stockholders' report
127
Although the adoption of such a proposal may create the danger of making
the annual report read like a 10-K report, 28 thirty-six years have passed since
industry first protested the proposal for filing and potential liability under
section 18(a). ' 29 During this interval, "[t]here has been a growth in the integrity
of annual reports and in the convictions of corporate executives that the
ultimate good of their corporations is best served by meaningful and accurate
disclosure to the financial market place.' 30 Since the annual report would thus
not have to be dramatically altered if required for SEC filing purposes, there is
little reason for management to fear such a proposal, especially if it were
accompanied by rules preserving management's opportunity to speak to its
shareholders in an informal fashion. 13 1
Although the ultimate responsibility for implementing these suggestions lies
liability if it was incorporated by reference in other "filed" documents. 17 C.F.R. § 240,12b-23
(1977).
125. The trend was forecast in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), which held that the defendant's misleading press release was
sufficient to satisfy the rule 10b-5 requirement that the misconduct be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." Subsequently, in Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), rule 10b-S was held to apply expressly to the annual
report. Similarly, in Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1231 n.27 (D. Del.), aff'd, 453 F.2d 876 (3d
Cir. 1971), the court recognized that false or misleading statements made in annual reports would
give rise to liability under rule 10b-5.
126. See notes 74-77, 88 supra and accompanying text.
127. Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. Law. 27,
33-34 (1969).
128. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 118-20 supra and accompanying text.
130. Sommer, supra note 106, at 1122.
131. Id.
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with the SEC, 132 the courts can play a key role in the process by following the
Supreme Court's approach 133 and continuing to reduce the scope of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 in areas that were meant to be covered by other sections.
In this manner, section 18 will be seen as something more than just a superflu-
ous provision, and the SEC may be encouraged to subject more material to its
coverage.
CONCLUSION
An effort must be made to delineate carefully the respective roles of section
10(b), rule 10b-5, and section 18(a). The legislative history clearly emphasizes
how Congress carefully tailored each provision of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to remedy a particular abuse. It is one thing for the courts to expand the
protection of a provision to cover new problems not perceived by Congress in
1934. It is quite another for this judicially created remedy to engulf situations
that were both foreseen and specifically provided for. Section 18(a) was not
intended to become a toothless tiger. It became so because both the courts and
the SEC enabled section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to become all-encompassing.
With the reordering suggested above, the 1934 Act should become a clearer and
more integrated statute, and consequently be of greater use to today's securities
investor.
John A. Occhipinti
132. See note 117 supra.
133. See notes 36-61 supra and accompanying text.
